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GROUP BUYING UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT:
THE AUTOMOTIVE PARTS CASES
BY ROBERT B. FLEMING*

Since 1949 the Federal Trade Commission has issued 22 complaints against
manufacturers and wholesalers of automotive replacement parts, asserting the
illegality of a certain group buying efforts under the Robinson-Patman Act.'
Nearly half of these proceedings were commenced in 1957 alone. Some of these
cases have reached the level of Commission decision and court review, but for
reasons to be noted, the group buying problem they manifest remains unsettled.
This paper may help to overcome one of those reasons by providing a study of
the matter. Beyond the immediate needs however, other factors suggest that these
cases may provide a fruitful basis for continuing the dialectic of Robinson-Patman,
underway now for over 20 years. The cases embody many of the most difficult
and controverted aspects of price discrimination, particularly functional discounts.
They will likely provide some decisive teaching in the area of buyer responsibility
under section 2(f) of the Act. And they present anew the appeal and conflict
which inhere in the cooperative "ideal" when viewed against a Robinson-Patman
background. Aside from price discrimination, the cases present a nice problem of
determining the circumstances under which corporate entity will be respected
when it may interfere with statutory regulation. The entity problem will serve as
the formal basis for much of the discussion.
It is assumed in the material which follows that the "improvement of.
distributive processes offers one of the broadest opportunities in American economic life today;" 2 that the Robinson-Patman Act reflects one stage of the continuing "struggle for the control of distribution;" and that non-legislative efforts
offer the only forseeable hope toward reconciling its inconsistencies. 3
I THE CASES AND THE INDUSTRY

Five of the cases referred to above, all involving seller liability under section
2(a) of the Act, have been concluded by court action affirming FTC cease and
desist orders; they are Moog, Edelman, Whitaker, Niehoff and P. & D.4 The group
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Buffalo School of Law.
1. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (1951).
2. Edwards, The Struggle for the Control of Distribution, 1 J. MAiurKTNG
212 217 (1937).
3. But cf., Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN.
L. REV. 3 (1953).
4. Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956); E. Edelman &
Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956); Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d
253 (7th Cir. 1956); C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957); P.
& D. Manufacturing Co. v. FTC, 245 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1957).
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buying problem, although present in each and relevant to decision in part, was
not primary nor vigorously contested, and therefore received inadequate attention.
Three other seller cases have terminated at earlier stages, again under circumstances
which obviated critical analysis of the group problem.5 Of the other cases under
2(a), five are pending short of initial decision, 6 and one, Standard Motor Products,7 has just been decided by the Commission. The opinion in that case does
deal with the group problem at some length, but only so as to demonstrate the
need for further analysis. The remaining eight complaints pending all name buying
groups and their members as respondents, and allege illegal inducement and
receipt of price concessions under section 2(f) of the Act.8 Hearings have been
commenced in at least two of these cases, and the complaints involved have
survived interlocutory appeals based upon the Automatic Canteen case.9
Generally it seems that throughout the course of the notably substantial effort
indicated, 10 the FTC has been aiming primarily at alleged threats to competition at
the second line of commerce, among purchasers for resale to the retail trade.
Altogether, the respondents in the 22 cases have yet to prevail on a significant
point, and the group buying concept has been condemned all round. But the
decisive stage is yet to come.
From the available "official" materials" the buying groups in question emerge
in the following form and context.' 2 Starting as early as 1936 when the Act was
passed but more often some time thereafter, various automotive parts jobbers
5. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 5720, May 20, 1955; Namsco,
Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 3771, March 17, 1953; Sealed Power Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 6654,
May 3, 1957.
6. Federal Mogul Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 5769, May 1, 1950; Eis Automotive
Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 6754, April 4, 1957; Airtex Products, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 6816,
June 11, 1957; Neapco Products, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 6891, September 23, 1957;
Guaranteed Parts Co., FTC Dkt. No. 6987, December 13, 1957.
7. Standard Motor Products Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 5721, order to cease and
desist, December 21, 1957, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. §26,960.
8. American Motor Specialties Co., FTC Dkt. No. 5724, December 20, 1949
Borden Aicklen Auto Supply Co., FTC Dkt. No. 5766, May 1, 1950; D. & N. Auto
Parts Co., FTC Dkt. No. 5767, May 1, "1950; Hunt-Marquardt, Inc., FTC Dkt.
No. 6765, April 5, 1957; Alexander-Seewald Co., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 6837, July 10,
1957; Midwest Warehouse Distributors, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 6888, September 23,
1957; Southern California Jobbers, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 6889, September 17, 1957;
Southwest Automotive Distributors, Inc., FTC Dkt. No . 6890, September 17, 1957.
9. Borden Aicklen Auto Supply Co. and D. & N. Auto Parts Co., supra
note 8; Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
10. Respondents in some of these cases have questioned the FTC's elaborate
efforts in these cases as compared to its relative inactivity against the "giant"
car manufacturers. See brief on behalf of E. Edelman & Co. before the FTC,
Dkt. No. 5770, p. 28.
11. Briefs, decisions, and opinions in the cases already concluded, including
StandardMotor ProductsInc., supra note 7.
12. There may be considerable variation from group to group with respect
to facilities, functions performed, etc., DAvIssoN, THE MARKETING OF AuTomoTIvE
PARTS

893 (1954).
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(wholesalers selling to retailers) gathered into groups to conduct their purchasing
on a cooperative basis. Their intention was generally to pool their market power.
Price advantages were usually the main initial consideration, but in some instances
other benefits may have been primary.'" Quantity discounts prevailed in the industry, and group aggregation of purchases achieved substantial rewards for member
jobbers. Such quantity discounts were most often cumulative in nature and paid in
the form of rebates. The buying group, after deducting expenses, paid over such
receipts to each member in proportion to his patronage. Purchase orders to sellers
could be sent by member jobbers directly or through the group office. Invoicing
by the seller was to the group only, which paid the bills and generally eliminated
credit and collection problems for the seller. Shipments of parts were usually made
by the seller directly to the member jobbers; only to a very limited extent did the
group headquarters handle the goods or have warehouse facilities for doing so.
There have been no assertions or even suggestions that the cooperative arrangements served to restrain competition among member jobbers; as often as not
members of the same group were geographically situated so as not to be in competion. By 1949 the group buying technique had become rather widely used; in the
Moog case respondent was shown to have sold to 15 such groups during that
year.14 Rebates obtained by the groups varied from 5 to 20 per cent of purchase
15
price.
In every adjudication to date, the group buying operation so described has
been found illegal as discriminating unfairly against ordinary jobbers. The examiner's statement in the Edelman case may be taken as representative: "In reality,
this group set-up is a bookkeeping device for obtaining, collecting and remitting
the warehouse discount received from respondent on purchases made by jobber
members. The latter, in fact, purchase their requirements directly from respondent,
receiving close to a 20% better price than if they had bought simply as a lone
jobber, instead of as a member of the group. The functional classification as warehouse distributor is basically artificial."'16 As indicated earlier, however, the
respondents in all of the concluded cases have been sellers, and they have not
7
strongly contested the validity of the group operations.'
Some characteristics of the automotive replacement parts industry should be
13. Brief on behalf of the FTC, p. 39, C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, supra
note 4.

14. In Standard Motor Products, Inc., supra note 7, the Commissioner states

that 1500 cstomers were buying through group organizations. This statement is
obviously erroneous; see Initial Devision, FTC Dkt. No. 5721, May 29, 1957, p. 4.

15. In 1954 one group was said to have averaged a 12% gain over the preceding six years. Minutes of a meeting held by a group then forming wherein
experience of other groups was discussed.
16.

Supra note 4. Initial Decision, FTC Dkt. No. 5770, March 5, 1954, p. 4.

17. E.g., respondent in the Moog case, supra note 4, did not challenge the
finding against group discounts before the reviewing court; and in the Edelman
case, supra note 4, respondent withdrew its appeal on the group issue.
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noted here, as found in official materials and other sources."8 Many of the independent parts manufacturers are small businesses, and this is the case with the
sellers in the proceedings under consideration.'9 Annual demand on the other hand
is very large; something on the order of five billion dollars' worth of replacement
parts and accessories are sold each year. 20 There is great variety in the means by
which these parts are distributed, but two patterns predominate: distribution
through independent wholesalers to the general repair or retail trade level, and
distribution through car manufacturer service programs. 2' These basic channel
patterns each account for about one-half of most of the market.2 2 Another significant channel is provided by mail order houses. The wholesalers and jobbers with
23
which we are primarily concerned exhibit several rather unique characteristics.
They are numerous-some 11,000 in 1948. They are generally small scale operations; average sales in 1948 were about $200,000. Their operating expenses are
relatively high. The automotive repair business requires a ready availability of parts
at the general repair trade level, yet there is no significant inventory carried at that
level Accordingly, wholesalers provide most of the necessary inventory, and many
of their sales are in retail quantities. The distribution of parts is a highly competitive business, within the independent wholesaler channel, and between that channel and the distribution system aligned with the car manufacturers. Not surprisingly, profit margins of the independent wholesalers are quite low; three per cent
24
on sales, before taxes, is not unusual
In the independent channel the second line of commerce may include several
steps. The seller may employ an intermediate wholesaler who redistributes to regular jobbers; such wholesalers are usually called warehouse distributors. There may
also be sub-jobbers between the regular jobbers and the general repair trade.
Wholesalers performing dual functions are- frequently found at the second line;
their functional compensation or discount (i.e., on sales to jobbers by the warehouse distributor who also competes as a jobber) is frequently on a price-byreported-use basis. Many times however, the discount for such services (selling
the jobbers) is merely part of an overall quantity discount, without distinction
made as to type of customers sold.25 The latter type of pricing, or what may have
been intended as such in part, was held to be illegal in the Moog, Whitaker, Nie.
hoff and P. & D. cases, quite aside from any group buying problems. In these
cases the respondents did not primarily defend their quantity rebates or the like
as being legitimate functional discounts, undoubtedly because they could not do so
18. The description of the industry which follows is based largely on
DAvISSoN, op. cit. supra note 12, supplemented by interviews in the trade.
19. E.g., Niehoff's total sales in 1949 were $2,317,000; in the same year
Edelman's sales volume was $1,600,000.
20. DAviSSON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 70.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. The following is based on DAVISSON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 772-75.
24. Id. at 829.
25. Id. at 932-33.
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convincingly. For all that appeared wholesalers performing whatever functions,
pure or mixed, could qualify depending only on quantity sold. On this particular
issue, the Commission and courts had little difficulty in finding against the respondents.
In the Edelman case the warehouse distributors received a set functional
discount (20%) not tied to quantity. This was held to be illegal because there
was no priciog by use.26 Again this holding was reached without regard to any
group buying problems. Edelman is important here because the Commission did
not attack the designated functional discounts as such. Thus the problem of the
groups, if viewed in the Edelman context, becomes one of attempted upward integration by cooperating jobbers seeking as a unit the functional classification of
warehouse distributor. In Moog and the other cases, the groups were condemned
by the company they kept; for who can tell when or if cumulative quantity rebates
are compensating for worthwhile services performed or merely reflect unfair discrimination. In an undifferentiated quantity discount situation, the "aggregating"
group members tend almost inevitably to appear as the worst offenders, if only
because of the long history of abuses along that line. Accordingly, in Standard
Motor Products the Commission hardly bothered to distinguish the group problem
from the quantity discount issue; "The group buying program ... with its system
of retroactive aggregate rebates has now been declared to be illegal."27 (emphasis
added)
Moog and the others did in fact wage forecful defenses on other issues,
however, especially that of finding the requisite injury to competition. On that
point they were eventually overcome by the combined force of the substantial
evidence rule and the Morton Salt case.2 8 Other issues presented were "like grade
and quality" and "meeting competition." Only Niehoff attempted to establish cost
justifications for their discounts.
After some consideration of cooperative buying generally, immediately below,
attention will be directed to the point of whether buying groups may qualify for
such functional discounts as were involved in Edelman. Such a classification was
found there to be basically artificial, but the appeal on this point was withdrawn
from the reviewing court.

JI GRouP BUYING IN THE PAST
The history of Robinson-Patman Act enforcement shows many instances of
group buying efforts. For present purposes it will be sufficient to discuss a few
of the problems raised heretofore.
26. As required by the rule of Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25 (1943).
27. Supra note 7, at p. 36, 485.
28. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
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Section 4 of the Act states an exemption for cooperatives which could be
construed to protect the auto parts groups. 29 While the exemption may be susceptible of such an interpretation, it will not be relied upon here or discussed extensively for several reasons. It would appear that the exemption has been almost
completely ignored in the past since the annotations reveal only two cases raising
the point" 0 Only one of these, Quality Bakers, is pertinent here and will be discussed below. Further, there are doubts about the coverage of section 4. One
authority states flatly that the exemption is available only to agricultural cooperatives. 31 In addition state laws relating to cooperatives may prevent the auto parts
groups from qualifying under section 4. Relatedly, the present structure of the
groups may bar qualification as "associations," because most of them are incorporated. 32 Lastly, the intent of Congress may have been to exclude from coverage
cooperating wholesalers, as distinguished from producers and consumers."3
Two important cases involving cooperatives in the grocery business should
be consiaered at this point. In the Red & White34 and IGA35 cases, the court
affirmed FTC orders against wholesalers and allied retailers engaged in cooperative
purciasing. The operations in question were not dissimilar to the auto group
schemes. Illegality however was based upon section 2(c) of the Act, the illegal
brokerage section, which prohibits receipt of brokerage fees in certain instances.30
Section 2(a) was not involved and the cooperative exemption was not raised.
29. Section 4, 49

STAT.

1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13b (1951), provides:

Nothing in this Act shall prevent a cooperative association
from returning to its members, producers, or consumers the
whole, or any part of, the net earnings or surplus resulting
from its trading operations, in proportion to their purchases
or sales from, to, or through the association.

30. Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940); Lane
Distributors, Inc. v. Tilton, 81 A.2d 786 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1951).
31. Hanna, Antitrust Immunities of Cooperative Associations, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 498 (1948).

32. Ibid. One of the groups presently under attack is organized as a Massachusetts trust, the Six-States group in Hunt-Marquardt,Inc., supra note, 8.
33. Before final passage of the Act, the House eliminated a clause from the
Senate enactment which specifically referred to cooperating wholesalers. H.R.

REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
34. Modern Marketing Service, Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945).
35. Independent Grocers Alliance Distributing Co. v. FTC, 203 F.2d 941 (7th
Cir. 1953).
36. Section 2(c), 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (1951), provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged In commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant,
or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission,
brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or
discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in
connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or
merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or
to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein
where such intermediary is acting in fact for, or in behalf, or
is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to
such transaction other than the person by whom such
compensation is so granted or paid.
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Section 2(c) had already been construed in a strong line of cases37 to preclude
receipt of brokerage whenever the intermediary was acting for or under the control
of the buyer, rather than the seller paying the fees. This rule obtained no matter
what services were actually performed by the intermediary.3 8 In the grocery cases
therefore, the court had little difficulty in deciding that the cooperative intermediary was buyer-controlled, by its members. The important point to note is that
no brokerage allowances are involved in automotive parts distribution, and the
inflexible rules of section 2 (c) are not applicable; analysis is not foreclosed.
The Quality Bakers case raised much the same issues as the grocery cases,
but with one addition. The buying organization relied upon the section 4 exemption of cooperatives as a defense. Again in the restrictive context of a section 2 (c)
case, the court found the buying operation unlawful. The court did not decide
whether the buying group qualified as a "cooperative association" under section 4.
The holding was simply that the exemption did not authorize even qualified associations to engage in practices forbidden by 2(c). Whatever the merits of this
decision, 39 the brokerage section again foreclosed any analysis of the corporate
entity issue that might have been helpful here.

III. THE CORPORATE ENTITY v. ROBINSON-PATMAN
In the course of the earlier discussion of the Edelman case, the suggestion
was ventured that the auto parts groups might seek legitimacy by having their corporate organizations, considered as business entities distinct from their shareholdermembers, achieve functional classification as warehouse distributors. The alternative
of considering member jobbers as being somehow individually integrated, does not
make good sense. Nor are the legal possibilities enhanced; quite the contrary. The
corporate entity notion, besides furnishing a vehicle for discussion, may offer an
acceptable tool to facilitate a favorable conclusion. In addition, one attempt has
already been made to base a defense upon corporate separateness, in StandardMotor
Products,4" and more can be expected.
A THE ENTITY POSSIBILITIES

1. The Legal background.
The usual phrases encountered when resolving a conflict between the corporate entity and statutory regulation are familiar enough: evasion or avoidance, a
37. E.g., Oliver Brothers, Inc. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
38. Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310
U. S. 638 (1940).
39. See Note. The Position of Cooperatives Under the Robinson-Patmanand
Fair Trade Acts, 26 CORNELL L. Q. 354 (1941).
40. Supra note 7.
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mere screen, a sham, an abuse of the privilege, and the like. The Commission in
order to disregard the entity in Standard Motor Products may perhaps have relied
upon the key factor which should bear in our consideration, the intent of the
4
statute, which may also be taken to include the simple necessities of the situation. '
Other factors to be considered are the intent of the parties and, of lesser importance, the general acceptance of the statute.
Taking the intent of the parties first, this issue may also include the concepts
of good faith, of preferring substance to form, and necessity of appraising the
equities involved. A leading case is U. S. v. Milwaukee Transit Co.42 It is especially
pertinent here, because it involved discrimination in railroad rates under an antidiscrimination statute. Before passage of the law, the shipper involved had been
receiving unfair rebates of the very sort that Congress intended to eliminate. When
the statute became effective, the shipper immediately organized a dummy corporation which purported to act as a soliciting agent, but in fact allowed the shipper to
continue receiving rebates. The court found that the intent of the parties was to
evade the law, because of the time sequence, a convincing lack of substance in the
subsidiary and a complete identity of interests and personnel. Good faith effort
was not evident, nor did any equities favor the arrangement; accordingly, the court
disregarded the entity to find a violation of the statute. Some significant differences
between this situation and that of the automotive groups will be discussed below.
In regard to the factor of intent of the regulatory statute, a case cited by the
Commission in Standard Motor Productsprovides a helpful example. In Corn Products Refining Co. v. Benson, Secretary,43 the issue was whether contracts to sell to
a wholly owned subsidiary were hedging operations so as to be valid under the
statute involved. The court disregarded the entity to hold that the arrangements
did not qualify as hedging. The intent of the statute was clear; hedging essentially
involves a shift in risk of loss. Since profit or loss achieved by the subsidiary would
accrue in any event to the parent, in the view of the court, the requirements of
the statute were not met. Essentially the court decided that the existance of a separate entity will not be permitted to frustrate the purpose of a federal regulatory
statute. Good faith and substance were not considered. In the words of another
case, "Courts simply will not let interposition of corporate entity or action prevent
a judgment otherwise required."44 In our cases on the other hand the intent of
the statute is far from being so clear, and the very matter at issue is whether an
adverse judgment is "otherwise required."
The third and less significant entity factor may perhaps be illustrated by a
41. Id. at pp. 36, 485-86.
42. 142 Fed. 247 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905).
43. 232 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1956).
44. In re Clarke's Will, 204 Minn. 574, 284 N.W. 876, 878 (1939).
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well known usury case, Jenkins v. Moyse.4 5 In that case a prospective borrower,
willing to pay more than the allowable rate of interest, formed a one-man corporation, transferred to it the property intended as security, and the corporation in
turn gave a mortgage on the property to the lender at the rate of interest agreed
upon. In foreclosure proceedings, the lender prevailed upon the court to apply the
usual rule that the usury defense was not available to a corporation. This refusal to
look beyond the corporate form to perceive an "evasion" of the law has been
attributed in part to the lack of a strong approval and general acceptance of the
usury regulation. 46 In considering the group buyers at hand, therefore, it is possible
that the ultimate decision may be favorably affected by the ambivalent characteroften reflected in judicial opinions--of the Robinson-Patman Act in relation to
the antitrust laws generally. This factor could be enhanced by the presence of the
cooperative principle, if that concept still retains much of its sympathetic appeal.
Recent Robinson-Patman entity cases add little in the way of useful analysis.
In one case 47 Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., sold television tubes to the Philco
Corporation at lower prices than it charged its own distributors. Philco sold these
tubes to distributors, one of which was a wholly owned subsidiary, Philco Distributors, Inc. The FTC held Philco and its subsidiary to be one, despite a showing
that the latter had a separate administrative, sales and accounting organization. By
disregarding the entity, prices to the Sylvania distributors and to Philco Corporation could be directly compared, and a violation of the Act was found 48 But in a
more recent decision, Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 49 Philco and the same
distributor-subsidiary were held to be separate. In the latter case the plaintiffretailer bought Philco products from the subsidiary, while a competing retailer
purchased directly from the parent, at allegedly better prices. Plaintiff's treble damage action under section 2(a) of the Act was dismissed, because he could not
show that the differing prices were charged by a common seller. This result
obtained despite a showing that, with one exception, the officers of the distributor
were also officers of Philco Corporation. The court and perhaps the plaintiff as
well apparently treated the issue as if public law considerations were involved,
applying the so-called alter ego test.
Neither of the Philco decisions seems helpful for present purposes. Most
likely however, Sylvania indicates the attitude the Commission will take when
faced with the auto parts groups, as they did in the Standard Motor Products
45.
46.
L. REV.
47.
48.

254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
Note, Efficacy of the Corporate Entity in Evasion of Statutes, 26 IowA
350 (1941). But of., BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §132 (1946).
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 5728, December 21, 1949.
See the order denying appeal from the examiner's ruling denying mo-

tions to dismiss, August 23, 1951.
49. 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
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case.50 The Bairn case on the other hand, just might indicate that the courts would
be susceptible to arguments which convey the suggestion that entity problems are
not peculiarly within the expertise of the FTC.
2. The auto parts groups as factual entities.
The "intent of the parties" factor as an element of entity problem analysis
was mentioned earlier in connection with the Milwaukee Transit case.51 The intent
factor as exhibited in the auto parts groups may best be explored by further
consideration of the facts. Concerning the inception 6f the groups, there can be
no convincing showing of lack of good faith such as would be indicated by a
change of form only, contemporaneous with passage of the Act. It simply did not
happen that way. In addition the motives of the group members cannot be
described as predatory or aggressive. The quantity discount system prevailing in
the industry invited, and competitive pressures made almost imperative, some sort
of cooperative defensive efforts. 52 FTC attorneys have consistently argued this
point to demonstrate the threat to competition posed by quantity-pricing practices,
which, they say, brought on the formation of the jroups.53 Lack of an intent to
evade is also shown by the substantial quality of the group organizations. Whatever
the records may show as of 1949, present day groups are frequently rather considerable enterprises. They have full-time salaried personnel and adequate capital;
not infrequently they own and operate a warehouse and physically handle more
than token amounts of the parts purchased by member jobbers. Such parts are
owned and insured by the groups. Further, they perform very real services of
considerable benefit to the members. As between members the central unit deals
effectively with the problem of obsolescent stocks and overstocking. Not only is
quality of purchasing improved, but members are of course simply relieved of a
significant portion54 of their individual purchasing chores, an important matter in
50. But of., Warren Petroleum Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 6227. In this proceeding
the examiner held that 51% ownership of a wholesaler by a supplier was not enough
to make the supplier responsible under Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act

for price cutting by the wholesaler. See initial decision, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
f125,857, February 10, 1956, affirmed without consideration of this issue,
926,218, September 17, 1956.

51. Supra note 42.
52. Interviews in the trade indicated that competitive pressure from several
directions was involved; large wholesalers with many branches, mail order houses,
and especially car dealers. The large wholesalers, dual-function or otherwise,
fare well of course in a quantity discount situation. Car dealers buy from vehicle
manufacturers who in turn buy to some extent from sellers such as Moog,
Edelman, et al. Vehicle manufacturers buy for two purposes, original equipment
and replacement. The danger of course is present, and apprehended in the trade
and by the FTC, that the vehicle manufacturers may distribute parts purchased

at very low "original equipment" prices to car dealers at prices low enough to

hurt independent automotive wholesalers. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co.,
FTC Dkt. No. 3977 (July 10, 1953).
53. Briefs on behalf of FTC; Moog, pp. 26, 27; Edelman, p. 33; Whitaker,
p. 16.
54. No buying group provides its members with all the lines or types of
parts the the members typically handle,
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this industry. And the centralized payment for goods and assumption of the overall
credit risk signifies the substantial financial responsibility of the group enterprises.
In regard to the equities raised by the group buying arrangements, 55 there is
no evidence to date that admission to the groups is unfairly restricted; 56 reliable
figures are not available to suggest the usual amount of investment required of
jobbers upon joining groups, but there have been no assertions that membership
is so expensive that many deserving prospects are excluded.57 Affirmatively, the
appeal of the cooperative concept, with its implications of preserving small business, is helpful, especially in this industry where the very large automobile companies play such an important role.
Considering the factors so far discussed, the auto parts groups can raise some
fairly strong and appealing arguments toward allowing their shareholders to repose
in decent modesty. But the last and probably decisive factor, which was termed
statutory intent in the earlier discussion of the hedging case,58 remains to be
considered.
B THE REGULATORY STATUTE
Continuing in terms of the analysis employed earlier, the issue becomes:
must the courts simply ignore the corporate entity of the buying groups, because
the Robinson-Patman Act "requires" such a judgment. May the jobbers cooperatively integrate upwards one step to the status of warehouse distributors.
Accordingly, consideration must be given first to the matter of functional discounts
under the Act.
1. Functional discounts.
In 1922 the FTC issued a cease and desist order against the Mennen
Company for failure to grant a wholesaler's functional discount to buying
cooperatives made up of retail druggists.59 The cooperatives involved operated
much like the present day groups under consideration, except on a larger scale,
and they had done so long eough apparently to daim some prescriptive rights.
The Commission indeed became the prisoner of its critics, for now it is attacking
in the auto parts cases that which it sought to defend in Mennen, even the
55. "Our only point is that considerations of equity cannot be abolished in
the name of effective competition." DiRLAM & KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION 277
(1954).
56. Apparently only the usual business tests are applied, such as sales
effectiveness and financial responsibility.
57. Interviews in the trade suggest a possible range of $2,000 to $5,000,
depending on the amount of warehousing done by the group.
58. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Benson, Secretary of Agriculture, mra.
note 43.
59. Mennen Company, 4 F.T.C. 258 (1922).
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Robinson-Patman Act could hardly have brought about such a reversal. Meanwhile, the critics, i.e., the courts, have also changed considerably since the days of
Gratz6 and Mennen. The immediate critic in Mennen was the 2nd Circuit Court
of Appeals, which dispatched the Commission's interpretation of Section 2 of the
Clayton Act with impressive vigor.61 The court's lesson, that the character of a
customer's selling (i.e., who does he sell to), not his buying determines his functional classification, was not lost on the Commission. It remains fixed in the
minds of some of the Commissioners today.62 To determine the Mennen customers' function, the court explicitly set aside the corporate entity of the drug
cooperatives. The members were simply buying at wholesale and selling at
retail; no wonder that any self-respecting seller 63 would decide to treat them as
retailers. At any rate the "character of selling only" view became traditional after
Mennen" and remains in contention today. Under this view the integrated
buyer cannot be compensated for services performed for or saved the seller, 5
because---as in the brokerage cases-he did not perform them "for" the seller,
rather for himself. 66
The contrary view, that character of buying may be considered, so that integration can be rewarded, prevailed in the Commission by a vote of three to two in
the Doubleday case.67 The examiner had excluded evidence offered by the respondent to show that extra discounts afforded three large jobbers were functional, in
compensation for services rendered the seller. The Commission reversed, holding
that the evidence must be considered.68 Chairman Howrey's opinion for the majority admirably stated the case for realistic recognition of the "proliferation of
modern marketing methods." He noted the many varieties of integration to be
found in the distributive phase of our economy. And he demonstrated the unfairness of a rigid legal ban on seller's compensation of valid integrative efforts. In
approving of a service-type functional discount, the Commission indicated, however, that careful appraisal would be required in such cases. No subterfuge would
60. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920). This case is usually taken to signify
the low point in FTC prestige vis-a-vis the courts. This case was relied upon by
the court which reversed the FTC Mennen decision, note 61 infra.
61. Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923).
62. See the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Secrest in Doubleday cGCo.,
FTC Dkt. No. 5897, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 125,634, p. 35,678 (September 2, 1955).
63. The Commissioner also found that Mennen had discontinued treating the
cooperatives as wholesalers in order to reach an "understanding" with the regular
wholesalers; see note 59 suprca at 278.
64. See the opinion of Chairman Howrey in Doubleday & Co., supra note 62,
for a discussion of the history of functional discounts after the Mennen case, and
the cases there cited.

65. Except of course under the restrictive provisions of section 2(d) of the

Act, of which more later.
66. Not surprisingly, Commissioner Secrest relied upon a brokerage case in
his dissenting opinion in Doubleday c&Co., supra note 62.
67. Doubleday &. Co., supra note 62.
68. After considering the evidence, the Commission held it Insufficient as
failing to establish any relationship between the discounts and the value of the
services rendered.
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be tolerated; the buyer must actually perform the functions; and the amount of the
discount must be reasonably related to the expenses assumed by the buyer. The
majority views were substantially in line with the recommendations of the Attorney
General's Committee earlier that year." Much of the opinion in fact repeats
verbatim the text of the Committee Report. The dissent of Commissioner Secrest
was to the effect that only the nature of the customer's selling was relevant, the
traditional view. Commissioner Mead, also dissenting, would allow only such
functional discounts as the seller could "cost justify" under the Act.
Five months after Doubleday, however, the Commission raised some doubts
over their new position on functional discounts in the General Foods case.Y°
Respondent there, in an effort to improve sales, had set up a number of wagon
distributors to sell the product involved directly to certain institutional customers,
with point-of-sale delivery. The wagon distributors were given extra discounts,
beyond those afforded existing wholesalers selling the same customers. Respondent
claimed first that the discounts were payments properly made under section 2 (d)
of the Act.7 ' The Commission disposed of this point without considering whether
the opportunity to earn similar discounts was available on "proportionally equal"
terms to the competing wholesalers. The Commission held that the services of
the wagon distributors did not qualify under 2(d) because their character
precluded equal availability to all. Even as between wagon distributors, one
would provide more services (by greater efforts to push the product), and
another less, yet all received the same discount. Respondent "was paying for a
certain method of doing business rather than for specific services actually
rendered." Such a reading of 2 (d) is usual and perhaps needed in dealing witb
the mischief of doubtful advertising allowances, but it does not solve the problem
of functional discounts.
General Foods raised that problem also, asserting that the wagon distributors
were of a different functional class than the wholesalers, because of differences in
their way of selling, and that therefore the discounts were proper functional
69. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMiITTEE, REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE
ANTTRUST LAWS, 202-209 (1955).
70. General Foods Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 6018 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 125,888

(March 1 1956).
71. ection 2(d), 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (1951), provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of
value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in
the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or
through such customer in connection with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold or offered for sale by such per-.
son, unless such payment or consideration is available on
proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing
in the distribution of such products or commodities.
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discounts. This argument was rejected, because the wagon distributors and the
wholesalers did in fact compete in selling the same customers. This decision was
not, however, a reversion to the "character of selling only" rule, nor did it express
the view that only functional discounts which do not injure competition are valid.
General Foods is consistent with Doubleday,7 2 because the wagon distributors and
the wholesalers had the same functional role. They served the same customers, and
the wagon distributors saved General Foods nothing by their methods of buying.
Valuable services were indeed rendered, but they were sales services only; no
upward integration was present to be left unrewarded. And section 2 (d), however
read, surely calls for equality of treatment under such circumstances; it was
prompted by false sales promotion and advertising allowances. The General Foods
case does make it clear however, that section 2(d) will never do to validate
functional discounts in any case; quite the contrary. The requisite specificity of
services could never be established, as an earlier commentator had suggested.73
Assuming then that the Doubleday precedent retains its vitality, the question
is whether the present buying groups qualify under it. Applying the tests suggested
by Chairman Howrey, an affirmative answer may be offered. First, there is no subterfuge present, as was shown in the earlier entity discussion. The group as a unit
is, or at least may be, a substantial and responsible enterprise; evasion cannot be
charged. The second test was whether the buyer actually performs the functions for
which he seeks compensating discounts; or, in our Edelman context, whether the
grouped jobbers perform the functions of a warehouse distributor. An analysis of
those functions may provide the answer. The negative argument is of course that
the group carries on significantly less physical warehousing of goods than the usual
warehouse distributor, so that equivalent discounts are not in order. This notion is
apparently the basis for the frequently heard assertion that the groups do not buy
on their own account. The argument can be met by mitigation, as well as confession and avoidance. It should be noted that the warehouse distributor does not
physically store all of the goods for which he receives sales credit. Drop shipments
and the like which go directly to the jobber from the manufacturer are not uncommon in this industry, as in many others. On such purchases by jobbers "through"
the distributor, the latter stands in the same posture as the buying group. Neither
sells solely from stock in the warehouse.
But there remains a significant difference in proportion of goods stocked, at
least for the present. As to goods not warehoused, the groups are not performing
one of the important services usually provided by the distributor. But the mere
storage of goods is not the critical element of the distributor's function. The
72. But of. the efforts made to reconcile a supposed conflict in the cases, Note,
Robinson-Patman Curtailments on Distribution Innovation: A Status Sought for
FunctionaZDiscounts, 66 YALE L. J. 243 (1956).
73.

Van Cise, Functional Prices, SYMPOSIUM ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Ac'r

(CCH 1957).
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supplier could store goods at least as cheaply as the distributor. The latter's really
vital role is to assure the supplier adequate representation of the product in the
particular market involved. The seller does not simply dispose of goods at a
reduced price when he grants functional discounts; he uses the discounts to buy
representation. 74 The ordinary jobbers actually provide this representation through
their relationships with the general repair or retail trade, one step below. The
warehouse distributor's role is to make this facility of "his" jobbers available to the
seller. The tasks entailed by this role are, then, contact, cultivation, selling and
servicing of jobbers. Suppliers may of course deal directly with the jobbers, and
often do, electing to establish the critical relationships directly, and at a cost. If
the seller instead relies upon the warehouse distributor to do this for him, the
seller saves that cost and compensates the distributor accordingly.
It can fairly be asserted that the buying groups accomplish the representation
role of the distributors with whom they seek equivalent classification. A ready
stable of jobbers is made available to the seller by the group. Stated perhaps oversimply, the warehouse distributor "holds" his jobber customers by sales solicitation
efforts and good service; the group accomplishes the same result by reason of the
patronage refund incentive of the cooperative scheme, along with equally good
service. So far, the courts have simply ignored this key representation function
performed by the groups; eg., "Except for one monthly billing instead of 9, the
operation saves Niehoff nothing."7 5 Such an analysis is untenable.
Other functions usual to a distributor are also carried out by the groups, such
as credit and collections, and product adjustment. On these points the group cannot be distinguished from the distributor.
To the extent that the group does less warehousing than the ordinary distributor, the supplier may incur proportionally higher freight and delivery charges.
Fairness would seem to require a lesser discount to the group, reflecting this lost
saving to the seller. But this could be managed without threatening the group's
74. The term "representation" as used here has to do with assuring a seller
pre-sold accessibility or channels to the real consumers, in our case the units
making up the general repair trade. The jobbers who are in demand by sellers
have regular customers for the various types of replacement parts (regardless, to
a large extent, of who manufactured these parts). Thus the jobber's custom is
what he can "sell" the manufacturer, and he usually does so for but one manufacturer of any line. See DAvIssON, op. cit. supranote 12, at 910.
75. C.E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, supra note 4 at p. 40. Cf. brief for FTC in
that case, p. 39:
The group organization though it permits no economies in
distribution and though it performs no real distributive
function is able to obtain a better price ....
In accord and equally untenable are the views expressed in Comment, A Further
Look at Functional Discounts, 54 MIcn. L. REv. 659, 676 (1956), which discusses
the Moog case, supra note 4.
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overall role and status as a "distributor;" rather, such a discount variation would
demonstrate the integrity of the group operationm
The adjustment technique just mentioned may also serve to meet a more difficult question. The warehousing performed by distributors is obviously more significant than mere storage. In this industry availability of parts in the field is critical.
The supplier not only wants representation or ready active channels, but the units
making up those channels must maintain inventories. The inventory load of the
industry is carried by all levels except the retail or repair trade. The buying groups,
however, to the extent that they stock less goods in their central warehouse, do
not assume the inventory function of the ordinary warehouse distributor. This
distinction will of course tend to disappear as the groups increase their warehousing. Again a reduction in functional discount to the groups may provide an answer;
although difficult problems of appraisal might arise. There is no information available to indicate whether suppliers are reflecting this point by varying discounts
between groups and distributors. 7 7 Perhaps it would not be surprising to discover
that the groups provide better or more secure representation than the usual distributors, thus making up for the lower inventory load assumed. Competition between
the two might then lead to equal discounts and also to sharing of the supplier's
distribution job.
The third Doubleday test is concerned with the size of the discount, it must
be reasonably related to the "expenses assumed by the buyer." If the object of this
test is to disqualify pseudo-integration and reward only valid distributive efficiency,
we can restate the concept in terms of the seller; the discount must be reasonably
related to the expenses saved by the seller. From the viewpoint of a seller, choosing
between alternative channels, that is the main consideration. He wants to rid
himself of a task he has been doing at some roughly-known given cost. If a group
and a distributor both agree to do part of that job for the same price (discount),
at a figure attractive to the seller, he may give them each part of the distribution
to carry out and will have no reason to vary the discounts between them. The
seller is not concerned with variations in the expenses of his two new "distributors." Viewing the third test in terms of the seller may be necessary because the
groups do not of course assume the same expenses as warehouse distributors. The
groups perform a function worth so much to the seller, but their whole aim is to
eliminate some of the warehouse distributor's expenses. It is submitted that savings
from such elimination should accrue to them. By this analysis, the groups would
again qualify for functional discounts. There is no adequate information available
to show the relationship between present group discounts and sellers' savings, but
76. Trade interviews revealed that at least one parts supplier now Imposes
a five per cent penalty for all drop shipments to jobbers, whether the sales are
made "through" a group or a warehouse distributor.
77. In the Edelman case, supra note 4, they were treated alike.
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the limiting factors are evident. Other things being equal, a seller will not choose
to deal with a group at a cost higher than if he carried out the distribution himself,
or higher than he would have to pay a warehouse distributor. In other words, the
seller pays the going rate for distribution, to either the group or the warehouse
distributor.
Altogether then, on the overall issue of functional discounts, the auto parts
groups would seem to meet the requirements of the law, according to the teaching
of the Doubleday case. At least it cannot well be argued that the mere fact of
cooperative ownership of the group entities by the jobbers requires those entities
to be set aside.
2. Injury to competition.
The view of functional discounts taken by the Commission in Doubleday
must necessarily displace another old rule, that functional discounts are valid only
if they do not cause "injury to competition," as that concept is contemplated by
the Act. This is sometimes thought of as the status theory, as against the service
theory of functional discounts seen in the Doubleday case.78 Validation of the
discounts, as suggested above will, it is to be hoped, result in competitive pressure
at the jobber level, with which the Commission is now concerned, and at the
warehouse distributor level as well. Jobbers lacking the patronage refunds of the
group members will claim injury. The best answer is provided by the Attorney
General's Committee. "Since aggressive competition among variously organized
marketing units is essential to generate the pressures toward eliminating waste
and better serving the consumer, no distributive pattern should be favored or
7'
prejudiced by law."
As to possible inequities, it should be recalled that the auto parts groups are
not exclusive clubs; so far as appears, any respectable jobbers are welcome to join
or form their own groups, and the initiation fees are probably modest. Further,
any proper concern over injury to other jobbers should, in assigning a cause for
that injury, recognize the investment costs of member jobbers as a factor diminishing the effect of their price savings.
3. Cost justification.
In the Edelman case the Commission suggested that the respondent "cost
justify" the discounts being granted to buying groups,80 according to the proviso in
section 2(a) of the Act. This suggestion of course raises new doubts that the
78.
79.
80.
p. 35,559

YALE L. J., supra note 72; and Van Cise, supra note 73.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMITrEE, REPORT, supra note 69 at 208.
E. Edelman & Co., FTC Dkt. No. 5770, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1125,445,

Cf. Note,

(April 29, 1955).
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Doubleday precedent is still controlling. It is dear that functional discounts can
never be fully cost justified; as indicated earlier, the seller buys distribution with
these discounts, and in a competitive industry like this one, he pays the going
rate. His cost savings act as a limiting factor, but they may be only roughly known
or forecast, and in addition other business factors may enter into a choice of
distributive channeL The difficulties of cost justification (as contemplated by the
Act) of functional discounts was forecast immediately after the law was enacted,81
and are only agravated by the nature of the auto parts industry.s2 Without discussion of the Commission's well known hostility toward cost justification attempts,
or the possibility that this attitude has been somewhat modified in recent years, it
can be fairly assumed that the cost justification proviso will not protect the group
discounts in question. The fact that the Doubleday case required only that functional discounts be reasonably related to the expenses assumed by the buyer was
not an inadvertence. If cost justification is to be required for group discounts, those
discounts will undoubtedly diminish considerably, perhaps to such an extent that
group membership will not longer be attractive to jobbers.
4. The buyer's responsibility
Section 2 (f) of the Act, stating the conditions of buyer liability, declares it
to be "unlawful for any person engaged in commerce in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited
by this section." As distinguished from the parts suppliers, the auto parts groups
and their members can thus only be attacked directly by means of this section, and
that is the case with eight of the complaints now pending before the Commission
as noted earlier 83 If the views expressed here obtain, qualified buying groups in
general will incur no liability, because the prices they receive will be lawful. The
lawfulness of those prices is the primary concern of this paper and has already
been discussed. Aside from that concern the pending cases obviously pose some
very difficult problems of applying section 2 (f). Perhaps this accounts for their
protracted pendency; one of the cases has not yet reached the state of initial
decision, nearly ten years after the complaint was issued.
The Canteen case 4 is the only important precedent in this area, and it
required the Commission to show that the buyer had knowledge or its equivalent
that the price concessions received were unlawful, in order to make out a prima
facie case.85 Of course, what the records will show in the older cases presently
pending is questionable; probably little if any warehousing but considerable sub81. "In regard to the seller's situation, the trade discount is at best only a

broadly generalized reflection of costs." McNair, Marketing Functions and the
Robinson-PatmanAct, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334, 347 (1937).
82. DAviSSON, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 938-41.
83. See notes 8 and 9 supra.
84. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).

85.

194-95.
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stance in the groups otherwise. The very recent cases may reveal groups that could
meet any of the tests discussed above. In the latter event, recalling the extended
discussion above, knowledge of illegality will pose quite an obstacle for the Commission. If evidence of lack of cost savings is required of the FTC, many perhaps
will view that prospect with pleasure, in light of the history of the cost justification
proviso. On the other hand, if the seller's "good faith meeting of competition"
defense under section 2 (b) is at issue, the corporate entitz problem comes right
to the fore in determining the knowledge requirement. In StandardMotor Products
th Commission asserted that since a supplier in meeting a competitive price in
order to sell to a newly formed group obtains new jobber customers, as well as
retaining his old ones among the group, his action would be aggressive, and therefore could not meet the requirements of section 2(b). On the same premise 6f
disregarding the entity of the group, the Commission also held that the respondent
seller could not have met the equally low price of a competitor, because the net
price to each member jobber varied, depending on his patronage refund from the
cooperative. Quantity discounts were involved, and under such'circumstances, by
the Commission's view, neither the seller's price to the members or his competitor's could be determined when the sales were being negotiated. Enough has
been stated perhaps to show that these cases pose enough 2 (f) problems to indeed
require ten years of consideration.
IV CONCLUSIONS
The views offered here if accepted would provide a basis for validation of the
group buying technique, under conditions which would not be impossible for
cooperatives to meet, and without legislative changes in the Act. The conclusion is
not applicable only to the automotive parts industry. Further, it is hoped that
these views may provide a more reasoned basis for disposition of the many pending cases than has been evident thus far.
Eventual approval of group buying by the Commission and the courts can
hardly be prophesied at this time. The authority of the Doubleday precedent is
much too questionable, especially considering the suggestion in Edelman that
group discounts be cost justified. Further the sequence of the auto parts cases,
decided and pending, will weigh against favorable decision, because of the cumulative quantity discount factor, because the sellers' cases have come up first.
Final disapproval by the authorities would be an unwelcome result. The
cooperative buying idea as discussed here surely offers a worthwhile opportunity
to vindicate the equitable interests embodied in the Robinson-Patman Act without
sacrifice of economic efficiency. One prophecy may be ventured; the buying groups
may prove sturdy and attractive enough to survive somehow, no matter what
conclusion these cases reach. Red & White, IGA, and the Mennen drug-cooperatives seem still to be with us.

